Realism, Technicism and "Neuroepistemology".
A relativist critic of Eliminativism.
By F. Boeck mag. et drs. phil.
Synopsis.
One of the great issues in this century philosophy of science is the so call realism/relativism debate.
The realist assume that science at least aim to give us a coherent and true relation of what the world is, and of what are the entities existing in it and the relation and law existing between them. This position is criticised by the relativist point of view assuming that science is only capable to give us models and useful technical tools to be used by us.
I shall intent to show the interest of this debate for the neurosciences, and in peculiar for the mind/body problem. To do this I need to characterise precisely at least one realist standpoint, and a relativist one. After a discussion about the two standpoints, I shall adopt a relativist position that I call technicism, and defend it.
Then, I shall expose one standpoint in the mind/body problem, and use the new defined technicist position to criticise it.
We shall see in the discussion that the statute of the epistemic subject is critical for the realist/relativist debate and that if this debate can be useful for the mind/body problem, some epistemological position take in account or are litteraly based in ultra realist reading of neurosciences. We shall conclude that what is at stake in these debates is not only the statute of sciences, but the statute of the self, and that the position of what is this statute is what is the most important thing about these debates.
First epistemological position: minimal realism.
"Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like, and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true".
Second epistemological position: Van Fraassen empirist constructivism.
"Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves such a belief only that is empirically adequate.".
Third epistemological position: Technicism.
"Science must give us technical tools (material or conceptual), that our subjectivity judge to be useful for us".
Mind/Body problem position: Churchland eliminative materialism.
" 1. Folk psychology is a theory;
2. (that) it is a theory whose inadequacies entail that it must be substantially revised or replaced outright (hence "eliminative") and
3. (that) what will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience (hence materialism)."
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