Fifty years after the end of World War II, controversy continues to swirl around the U.S. decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan. In fact, just this week the director of the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum resigned after mishandling the Enola Gay exhibit. The heart of the revisionist historians’ case is that the decision to drop the A-bombs was motivated by American racism or some other factor--not by the reasons stated by the Truman Administration: namely, that the U. S. believed the Japanese would never surrender and that an invasion would inflict horrifying casualties on American troops.

The revisionists’ case, never terribly convincing, is now completely implausible. While researching my book on World War II, I uncovered new evidence about the motivation of the American leaders who authorized the dropping of the A-bombs. I looked at newly declassified Magic intercepts of Japanese diplomatic communications, the very documents that top U. S. leaders were reading in 1945. I also looked at the minutes of meetings where the decision to drop the Bomb was made. Together, the Magic intercepts and the meeting notes make a convincing case that the decision to use atomic weapons was the correct one, given what the White House knew in August, 1945.

Magic Revelations

The Magic summaries (and the Ultra intercepts of German communications) were one of the key reasons that the Allies were able to foil the Axis plans of world domination. Only six Americans were authorized to read these intercepts. Of these six men, only one was elected. That was President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he did not see, nor did he read, everything. The other policy-making recipients of Magic were: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, the chief of naval operations (the last being Adm. E. J. King) and Gen. George Marshall, the Army chief of staff. The most important of these decision makers was Gen. Marshall.

From my studies of some 15,000 pages of Magic Diplomatic Summaries declassified to date, it is obvious that Marshall knew from the Magic Summaries early in the war that Josef Stalin was never going to help the U. S. in its fight against Japan in the Pacific until Russia could profit from the move. Soviet policy forced the Americans to wage a series of costly island invasions so that the U. S. could establish land-based air superiority over Japan.

Marshall also knew prior to the February 1945 Yalta Conference that Russia would break its nonaggression pact with Japan and attach Manchuria about 90 days after the surrender of Germany (V-E Day). The Magic Summaries documented the shift of Soviet troops by rail from Europe to the Far East for this purpose. Because of a major intelligence failure, Marshall also believed that the Japanese had maintained their troop strength in Manchuria and were capable of resisting a Soviet attack. But Tokyo had secretly brought back many of its troops from Manchuria to defend the home islands of Japan from an American invasion, leaving Manchuria and Korea easy prey for the Russians.

Marshall also knew from the Magic decrypts that the Japanese home islands were to be defended from invasion and occupation by 2.3 million troops, another four million Army and Navy employees and a newly created armed militia numbering 28 million. These defenders were sworn to fight to the death, which so many Japanese troops had done in battles throughout the Pacific.

To effectively invade and occupy Japan, American strategists foresaw two invasions, scheduled for November 1945 and March 1946. The first invasion, on the island of Kyushu, would employ some 770,000 American troops. The follow-up invasion on the plains of Tokyo, leading to the forced occupation of Japan, called for two million American troops.

This brings us to the heart of the Enola Gay argument made by revisionist historians who claim (1) that President Truman either invented after the fact high invasion casualty estimates to provide moral and political justification for the use of atomic weapons; or (2) that Truman was never told about potentially high invasion casualties; or (3) that archival documentation for pre-invasion casualty estimates does not exist; or (4) that the pre-invasion estimates were minuscule.

But according to documents I have uncovered (see above), a confer- ence to discuss pre-invasion casualties was held at the White House on June 18, 1945, between President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the Pacific, Gen. Douglas MacArthur submitted rather optimistic casualty esti- mates. This caused Adm. William D. Leahy, Truman’s military advisor, to take charge of the session. Based on the experience at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Leahy predicted that in an invasion of Japan, 30% to 35% of U. S. soldiers would be killed or wounded during the first 30 days. Truman obviously understood what Leahy said. The president remarked that the invasion would create another Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.

Suddenly, and only after being advised about the buildup of Japanese forces and fortifications by Magic intelligence, MacArthur’s medical staff revised its pre-invasion needs for hospital beds upwards by 300%. Mac- Arthur’s chief surgeon, Brig. Gen. Guy Denit, estimated that a 120-day campaign to invade and occupy only the island of Kyushu would result in 395,000 casualties.

Marshall then learned from the Magic Summaries, just before the Potsdam Conference convened on July 17, 1945, about behind-the-scenes negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union. From June 3-14, 1945, Koki Hirota, a Japanese envoy with Emperor Hirohito’s blessing, had met with the Russian ambassador to Tokyo to propose a new relationship between the two countries. Japan proposed to carve up Asia with the U.S.S.R. According to the Magic Diplomatic Summary of July 3, 1945, Hirota told the Russian ambassador: “Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequaled in the world. . . . .” The Magic Summaries further revealed that throughout June and July 1945, Japan’s militarist leaders were adamantly determined that they would never surrender unconditionally to the British and the Americans.

On July 4, 1945, the British agree to the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. On July 18, during the Potsdam Conference, the first A-bomb was successfully tested. A way had been found to end the war quickly and decisively. This was the situation on July 26 when the U. S., Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration to Japan to surrender unconditionally. “The alternative,” said the declaration, “is complete and utter destruction.”

On July 28, Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki announced to the Japanese press that the Potsdam Declaration was to be “ignored.” Meanwhile, the Magic Summaries revealed that Tokyo was demanding that Moscow accept a special envoy from Emperor Hirohito, presumably to cement the deal offering to divide Asia between Japan and Russia while Moscow brokered a Japanese surrender with the U. S. and Britain that would be acceptable to Tokyo.

This is what the Americans--President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson and Gen. Marshall--knew the day before the first atom bomb fell on Japan. Confronted by an enemy leadership that was self-deluded, neither prepared to surrender nor to negotiate seriously, the Americans decided that the only way to end the war quickly would be to use overwhelming force: nuclear weapons.

Two bombs were dropped. The Russians invaded Manchuria. On August 10, Emperor Hirohito overruled his militarist advisors and accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Japan surrendered.

Propaganda Campaign

But the Americans continued to read the Japanese codes. Almost immediately, the Magic Summaries revealed that the new foreign minister, Mamora Shigemitsu. had begun a world-wide propaganda campaign to brand the Americans as war criminals for using nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s goals included keeping Emperor Hirohito from being tried for instigating a war of aggression, and diverting Western attention away from the many Japanese atrocities committed since the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. “Since the Americans have recently been raising an uproar about the question of our mistreatment of prisoners (of war),” Shigemitsu instructed his diplomats in the September 15, 1945, Magic Summary, “I think we should make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question in our propaganda.” That propaganda campaign has borne final fruit in the revisionist account of the bombing of Japan.

Yet the evidence is crystal clear. The use of nuclear weapons to end World War II quickly and decisively averted the death or maiming of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. It also saved the lives of some 400,000 Allied prisoners of war and civilian detainees in Japanese hands, all of whom were to be executed in the event of an American invasion of Japan. Above all, it saved untold hundreds of thousands more Japanese--perhaps millions--from becoming casualties of pre-invasion bombing and shelling, followed by two invasions and forcible occupation.

By Bruce Lee
Mr. Lee is the author of “Marching Orders:
The Untold Story of World War II.”
published by Crown Publishers.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C070233

14 June 1945

URGENT - IMMEDIATE ACTION

Memorandum for
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The President directed me today to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wishes to meet with the Chiefs of Staff in the afternoon of the 18th, in his office, to discuss details of our campaign against Japan.

He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin.

He will want information as to the number of men of the Army and ships of the Navy that will be necessary to defeat Japan.

He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper.

He desires to be informed as to exactly what we want the Russians to do.

He desires information as to what useful contribution, if any, can be made by other allied nations.

It is his intention to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.

Economy in the use of time and in money cost is comparatively unimportant.

RETURN TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
[DECLASSIFIED] R&RA SECTION, ROOM 2-O-934
THE PENTAGON [DECLASSIFIED] J.C.S FILE COPY

War Stories-My Personal Account

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