BUSINESS
CIVILISATION FROM POSTMODERNISM TO NEOFEUDALISM
Gabriel
Donleavy, 1995
ABSTRACT
The
purpose of this paper is to present parallels between the eclipse of the grand
narrative of ancient Rome by the deconstructive barbarian post classicists and
the eclipse of the grand narrative of the modernist Rationality project in its
managerial form by deconstructive iconoclastic postmodernists: but to do so in
such a way as to raise the question whether a new grand narrative could emerge
from the ruins of Modernity that echoes the emergence of the feudal grand
narrative from the ruins of Rome.
INTRODUCTION
Even
the most casual surf through management abstract databases throws up numerous
attempts to articulate and communicate post-modern perspectives on organisations.
The most frequently occurring theses seem to be the following.
1.The
modernist organisation was/is a bureaucracy whose characteristics of
hierarchical structure, extreme division of labour and oligopoly are becoming
outdated in the age of niche markets, lateral structures and globalisation
(Firat et al 1994). Economics itself, the dominant conceptual framework of the
business school is modernist, rational prescriptive, and unable to explain or
predict real economic events as a result. When a theoretician tries to expand
traditional paradigms, he is simply marginalised (see for example, the
inattention given to Vaga's (1989) Coherent Market Hypothesis, a serious and
convincing replacement for the modernist white elephant dogma called the Efficient
Market Hypothesis).
2. The
post-modern perspective foregrounds semiotic discourses, the maintenance of
capitalism through the hegemony of manipulated hyper-realities where every
Forest Gump of a consumer can shake hands with dead Presidents and the privileged
analytical tool is deconstruction of the text of any managerial or analytical
claim especially the modernistic claims of empirical quantitative research to
be the best discourse about reality.
3. The
post-modern perspective denies primacy to any one mode of representing reality
but rather tends to deconstruct the act of representation itself. The influence
of IT is argued to operationalize hyper-realities, to eclipse hierarchy by
networked laterality and to democratise organizational communication and
decision-making and to render the boundary-skin of the corporation porous to
outside influences and inside leaks to an unprecedented degree.
4.
Postmodern management is related to administrative and manufacturing
flexibility "but this flexibility does not necessarily mean more
individual empowerment and self-control. Surveillance, for example, did not die
because organizations got flatter and flexible; rather, surveillance with
computers, videos, and electronic sensors made many layers of middle management
unnecessary in this postmodern world." (Clegg, in Boje 1993:192)
5. The
postmodern detachment of signifier from signified has its counterpart in the
decay of shares into counters. The Foucauldian convergence of power with
knowledge is operationalized by IT turning knowledge into databases, so
knowledge ceases to be known but instead is consumed. Knowledge not swept is
marginalized. Benetton (per Clegg 1990) exemplifies advertising in a postmodern
style, commodifying the harsh reality from which it selects its images to
hyper-realise its own logo. It is distinctive in its combination of IT at its
core, franchising of retailers who may only stock Benetton goods, and supplied
through some 200 small subcontractors of varying degrees of independence.
Finally no production is for stock but only in response to retailers' orders.
Moreover,
Benetton is postmodern in its organizational boundaries. "Is Benetton
perhaps better thought of less as an organization per se and rather more as an
organized network of market relations premised on complex forms of contracting
made possible by advances in microelectronics technology?" (Clegg
1990:121)
THE
EAST IS READ
It is
not uncommon in managerial literature, modernist and postmodernist, to find
East Asian corporate forms and rituals posited as containing worthwhile
examples for the rest of the world. The family firm as the scaffolding of trust
building is often the focus of such work. In East Asia, the rise of genuine
imitations exemplifies Baudrillard's simulacra whose signification value
interacts with the signification value of the costly originals. So, a Hong Kong
fake Rolex is worth more than a Thai fake Rolex in mid 1995, and both are both
more than Taiwanese copy Swatches. The appreciation of a good copy has sustained
the market for pirated software and cloned hardware
throughout
the East, where few buyers see why they should assist Microsoft's monopolistic
ambitions and many distributors say off the record that piracy whets the
buyers' appetite for the "real" thing when they can later afford it.
Much of
the fascination with the East is traceable to an uncritical awe at the
spectacle of rapid economic growth there which is apt to be seen as reflecting
greater thrift, greater industriousness and greater efficiency. The myth of
greater efficiency is deconstructed neatly by Stanford economist Krugman (1994)
who shows higher Eastern output figures have been closely matched by higher
inputs so there has been no raising of any aggregate input-output ratios - only
a purely capacity effect. This applies not only to the little dragons; Taiwan,
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and now South East China too but also to the
exemplar of them all, Japan. After the War, Japan dismantled its zaibatsu and
replaced them with keiretsu, enterprise groups blessed by the MITI officials.
In
Japan "the enterprise groups dominate whole areas of employment through a
vast number of subcontract firms. Although formally independent these are
highly structured and semi-formalized and enjoy ongoing relations with the big
name and enterprise core companies. Effectively, in Muto's (1986:135) phrase,
they are 'vassals' of the big companies. In turn, many of the subcontracting
firms themselves rely on work subcontracted out to smaller subcontractors who
in turn subcontract to female domestic outworkers who work on piece-wage rates
far removed from those of the enterprise union members." (Clegg 1990:147).
I want to suggest that such vassalage prefigures one possible outcome of
postmodern changes in business structures and that corporate vassalage of the
Japanese type will be echoed in certain respects by personal vassalage within
the firm. This key term, vassalage, can only be appreciated by a minimum
consumption of data about its original medieval meaning; and I essay that task
in a few paragraphs' time.
AFTER
POSTMODERNISM
Since
managing by numbers collapses time frames so as to render long term investment
valueless, in conglomerates, individual businesses are reduced to bargaining
chips, quickly acquired and shed. 'A 'successful' American manager doesn't
plant or harvest,' Thurow (1984:23 comments, 'he is simply a Viking
raider." Managing by numbers is a Taylorist sourced badge of that part of
modernist managerialism now often called Fordism. In post Fordism, numbers seem
to play a greater rather than a lesser role, as the attempt is made to emulate
the Japanese with just-in-time inventory control, quality improvement
programmes and an extension of scorekeeping into such new areas as not for
profit performance indicators. In capital markets the securitization of loans
and the widespread use and abuse of derivatives has made stock funded
organizations susceptible to raids in the West while in the East family and
enterprise group clusters have so far deferred the Viking raid experience.
However when the families quarrel and family management succession fails, raids
do occur (in Hong Kong, Evergo Holdings under the Lau brothers is a prime
exemplar of a group that got big by raiding). In Britain the 1995 AGM of British
Gas, a privatised utility, made history when its shareholders voted no
confidence in its Board in general and its overpaid CEO in particular. The
modernist assumption of the primacy and stability of the Board of a listed
company is being displaced by a postmodern mix of governance styles and of
differentially located sources of corporate power. After postmodernism, some
ways of networking and bonding may well be seen to have greater survival than
others
In the
opinion of one pair of commentators on postmodernism, "the only cure for
postmodernism is the incurable illness of romanticism" (Appignanesi and
Garratt 1995:173). Neo-romanticism is exemplified in Sabel (1982:220) who
foresaw high tech cottage industry facilitated by new technologies fostered by
local state initiatives with Benetton's Emilia-Romagna network as the paradigm
case. What is missing from that view is the combination of ritual and vassalage
that makes both for charisma and for socio-economic stability, both being
qualities any future reaction against postmodern instability and
depersonalisation are arguably likely to privilege. If this occurs, then a
re-creation of some key features of medieval feudalism becomes a likely
process. Some of those features are already in place as will be argued next.
THE
FEUDAL PARADIGM
Feudalism
is one of those terms like postmodernism that in some mouths means an epoch and
its episteme, but in other mouths means a pattern of organization and
communication and power relations. Brown (1974:1086) surveys the use of the
term feudalism finds it to be applied heterogeneously and inconsistently
between historians and recommends teaching students to use the term "only
with specific reference to fiefs."
In any
system that can meaningfully be termed feudal; "public authority has
become a private possession. Everyone expects the possessor of a 'court' to
make a profit out of it and everyone knows that the eldest son of the
court-holder will inherit this profitable right, whatever his qualifications
for the work. On the other hand, any important accumulation of private property
almost inevitably becomes burdened with public duties. The possessor of a great
estate must defend it, police it, maintain roads and bridges and hold a court
for his tenants. Thus lordship has both economic and political aspects; it is
less than sovereignty, but more than private property." [Strayer 1952:17].
FEUDAL
SOCIETY: SOME PRE REQUISITES?
From
what sort of society does some kind of feudalism evolve? Daniel Bell draws a
picture, thus. "The foundation of any liberal society is the willingness
of all groups to compromise private ends for the public interest. The loss of
civitas means either that interests become so polarized, and passions so
inflamed, that terrorism and group fighting ensues, and political anomia
prevails; or that every public exchange becomes a cynical deal in which the
most powerful segments benefit at the expense of the weak." (Bell
1976:245)
'Some
people today write about post-industrial society: the nearer prospect, I fear,
is the emergence of a post-society industry. In fact, to a much greater extent
than is now imagined, liberal society has already disappeared. Those who
persist in framing political and economic discussions in terms of defending and
preserving it, in fact, directly contribute to the sterility of intellectual
and political activity today.'(McDermott 1991:13)
THE
ORIGINAL FEUDALISM SUMMARIZED
The
original feudalism slowly arose in Europe after the barbarian dismemberment of
the Roman Empire when Germanic tribes overran Europe. Various explanations of
the rise of feudalism in Europe are available. For example, Tainter (1986)
argues Rome was one of a series of societies that collapsed under the weight of
their increasingly complex organization. On the other hand, Chris Wickham
(1984) attributes the rise of feudalism to the eclipse of the burdensome but
ineffective Roman tax collection system by the advancing barbarians' preference
for rent over tax. Roman freemen sold land to patrons then rented it back in return
for protection. By Charlemagne's time, office and power meant land Vassalage,
the principal relationship in feudalism, meant holding estates in return for
service, usually military service. The fief was land plus peasants to work it;
land on which the vassal was immune from law so was ruler of it in all
respects. To become a vassal a man had to appear before his lord of the manor
(his 'demesne' lord), put his hands inside the lord's by way of homage and
swear faith against all men to his lord by way of fealty. An edict of
Charlemagne in the ninth century justified desertion by a vassal if his lord
failed to protect him when able to do so, when the lord ravished his wife, when
the lord attacked him with drawn sword, when the lord plotted against his life
or the lord sought to reduce him to servitude. A faithless lord [or vassal] was
thus a felon. Fiefs were eventually hereditary but the successor had to swear
fealty for his title to be secure. Vassalage was always personal and was mostly
restricted to fighting men. Similarly only one possessed of a cheval (horse)
could display chivalry in its initial meaning. Noble boys started as pages, at
around 14 became squires, and then graduated by means of the
"accolade" to knighthood at around 21. The accolade was often
accompanied by the formula 'sois preux' (be one who displays prowess), a
combination of skill and bravery and loyalty to lord and his own plighted troth
(Stephenson á1942). The troth was the origin both of the modern word 'truth'
and the medieval idea of faithfulness to one's word (Way 1986). It was a quite
central idea in feudal Europe that a promise was unbreakable.
THE
OFFICE AS A FIEF
Vassalage
was, in some senses, the medieval equivalent of employment. The vassal employee
paid homage to his lord in a ritual act promising aid and obedience in exchange
for protection, succour and the fief itself which came to be conveyed in a
ritual called investiture, immediately following the homage. The vassal held
his fief only so long as he served his lord, and could be ejected on failure to
do so. Since homage and fealty obligations were personal, the lord of a lord (i
e the suzerain) was owed nothing by the vassals of the intermediate lord (i.e. the demesne lord) (Ganshof 1952:88). A
fief was granted against an obligation to serve, often in a specialized way
with skilled military, managerial or clerical labour. In this it was unlike the
villein tenement (aka serfdom) which was granted in return for unskilled labour
obligations usually associated with work in the fields. Their lord could sell
serfs to other lords together with their holdings (Hyams 1980:6-14). Serfs were
not allowed to alienate their own land without the permission of the lord of
their manor (Hyams 1980:43)
The
distinction between serfdom and vassalage compares to the modern distinction
between wages and salaries. Eventually a detailed covenant elaborated the
ceremony of homage and investiture. The serf was a free man with recourse to
the assize courts except in relation to his lord whose word and court were
unappealable. In modern parlance, the serf could not take the boss to court for
mistreatment short of murder. The serf was thus more like the modern unlawfully
employed and exploited illegal immigrant labour than like the more usual kind
of wage earning worker. The free vassal was more like the modern office worker
with the office being remarkably similar to a fief. Like a fief, an office is a
piece of real estate to which duties of service attach. Like a fief, an office
can be removed from the occupier on demand by the boss, with no recourse
whatever by the tenant to the courts. In this respect medieval tenants were
better off, as they had available the writ of novel disseisin at the assizes
where their claim to have been wrongfully dispossessed by the demesne lord
would be heard. The lord would usually argue that dispossession was imposed for
failure to perform the services implicit or explicit in the fief. The courts
would decide on the evidence, and evidence was even more crucial then than now.
The modern employee has the possibility of bringing an action for wrongful
dismissal altogether but not for wrongful dispossession of an office. There is
no right in any law to occupy specific office space as an employee, but it is
natural and observable that occupation thereof is in the gift of the boss of
the manor and that his disposition judgments will reflect a combination of
seniority, function and the extent to which the vassal is in favour. It is
almost universally observed that personal status in a firm is associated with
office size and comfort; and this association is the essence of fiefdom.
STATE
AS CHURCH: FIRM AS MANOR
A
crucial element in the transformation of the Roman system into the wholly
different medieval feudal system was the influence of the new religion of
Christianity, which at first undermined the old order and later provided the
spirit and shaped the institutional forms of the new order. (Heilbroner
1976:94/5) As for the importance of the Church and religion in feudalism, this
should be understood as essentially a means of bringing order and peace to a
society of warriors (Foss 1975). Around
989 a council of bishops at Charroux began to impose the church’s limit on
violence, anathematising anyone who stole from churches or peasants or struck
an unarmed cleric. The synod of Le Puy in 990 extended the Church's protection
to merchants, their mills and vines. This was the beginning of the Pax Dei
(Peace of God) which by 1041 extended to forbidding fighting on holy days. On
27 November 1095 Pope Urban II bitterly condemned the depredations of the
gangster knights throughout Europe and promised them eternal damnation unless
they threw the Turks out of Jerusalem. By the mid 13th century the ceremony of
conferring knighthood exhorted the knight to defend widows and orphans against
the cruelty of heretics and infidels. Thus had the church transformed a simple
rite of passage into a sacrament and general pillage into a crusade. The quick
success of the First Crusade in capturing Jerusalem in July ì1099 seemed to
confirm the divine blessing on western knighthood. The Templars, constituted in
1128 were the extreme example of the union of arms and across, approved
explicitly by no less a figure than St Bernard who, in "De laudibus novae
militiae", said Templars committed not homicide but
"malicide".These days, private battles mean business battles and
battlefields mean markets. Raids mean hostile takeovers and white knights mean
white knights.
A novel
entitled "Black Easter" by James Blish draws to its conclusion with
Satan having replaced God and finding that he has to do the job of running the
universe in very much the same way as God had done. The decline of the church
in the West has been paralleled by a rise in State responsibility for regulation
of the relationship between people and corporations involving criteria of
equity, contractual freedom, good faith and honesty. This emerging role of the
State received an important boost in mid century with the New Deal, with
Keynesianism, and with the phenomenon of Nazism and Stalinism persuading a
large number of people that the State was very much a moral force for good or
evil, with secular ideology filling the gap left by ecclesiastical theology
(but not doing so adequately). Since the Second World War, the dominant world
conflict of economic ideologies resembled the post-medieval conflict between
Catholicism and Protestantism; but as the Cold war waned and finally faded away
so the tensions between the West and Islam grew more pronounced in an ironic
echo of the medieval Crusades. At the same time, human rights became a more
central political concern in much of the world. Indeed it is arguable that as
the "Peace of God" was to the Church
900 years ago, so human rights are now both to much of the modern Church
and to the secular successors of the Church's authority in the West. The chief
behavior modifying instrument of such authority is the law. When the law has to
deal with the managerial behavior of the modern company, it is as reluctant to interfere
with business decisions as the old royal courts (especially the assizes) were
to interfere with what they might have characterized as proper manorial
decisions. The duties of directors in British Commonwealth company law
critically focus on the notion of acting in good faith in the interests of the
company. In the leading case on the matter in the Commonwealth, an important
perspective was expressed by Lord Greene in Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd ([1942] Ch
304 CA) thus; "They [the directors] must exercise their discretion bona
fide in what they consider - not what a court may consider - to be in the
interests of the company." Nonetheless the courts limit the directors'
discretion by the test of the interest of shareholders generally, which tends to
mean maximizing profits within a reasonable period. (Eg Parke v Daily News
[1962] Ch 927). When a director uses the company to benefit third parties, the
courts will punish this as a breach of the duty of loyalty even though the
company is unharmed by it (Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC ì134).
As regards the standard of care required of directors, the courts take the view
that those who appoint the board must bear the consequences of their foolishness (Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Ltd [1925] 1 Ch á407). A recent American judgment was that directors
were distinguishable from trustees in that directors were appointed to take and
manage risks and that imposition of liability for mistakes would hamper that
role (Dynamics Corp of America v CTS Corp [1986] 794 F 2d 250/256). In
contested takeovers the directors are obliged to accept the highest offer, and
here the courts will review ordinary business judgment, per Lawton L J in Heron
International Ltd v Lord Grade [1983] BCLC 244(CA). In the US this is known as
the Revlon principle after the objective test of care whether the highest offer
was recommended or not in Revlon Inc v
Macandrews and Forbes Holdings Inc. However, in England, Hoffmann J in Re Welfab Engineers Ltd (1990) BCC 600, held
that it was not a breach of directors'
duty to accept other than the highest of three very closely similar offers in
order to secure the workforce's future employment. The law steers clear then,
of interfering with business judgments of directors so long as they act in the
interests of their company, and this will usually be presumed. Thus the Board
of a company is like a medieval chief vassal who has de facto immunity from
interference by the law on his own manor, so long as he is a faithful vassal. A
whole literature of scholarship, that of agency theory, has gown up to examine
the economic pressures on the board shareholders relationship that might make
the board act in something less than the shareholders' best interests. However,
the law does not require directors to
act in the shareholders' best interests other than in takeover situations: only
that they do not try and benefit outsiders at the expense of the company - a
much less onerous burden. Stock options, lavish treatment of leading non
executive shareholders and the
maintenance of dividend levels are among the several mechanisms commonly
observed to build mutual confidence between boards and shareholders. These
things exemplify the creation of trust by institutional mechanisms; and it is
to the creation of trust that we turn next.
TRUST
CREATION
The
notion of trust is central to all economic exchange. Implicit within exchange
is a set of common expectations that define appropriate and inappropriate
behaviors. These common expectations exist prior to contracting; they provide
the necessary background conditions that allow individuals to come together and
barter or contract. (Neu 1991).
Zucker
(1986) identifies 3 different modes of trust production, as follows:-
1.
Process based, where trust is built on experience of transacting between the
parties which builds reputation that goes outside the parties themselves.
2.
Characteristic based, where trust is evoked by membership of a class, club,
race, profession, school, family, clan or just appearance.
3. Institution
based, where trust is tied to formal structures such as contracts, professional
certification, use of neutral intermediaries and subjection to effective
regulatory structures. Zucker argues that in the American industrial revolution
of the last century, process based trust was disrupted by high rates of
corporate birth and death, rapid increase in human population diversity of
cultures of origin arising from massive immigration, and by industrialization
itself. Institution based trust became necessary once there was significant
social or geographic distance between transacting groups, and the bureaucratic
form of organization is argued to be one of the most important of such
mechanisms. Zucker posits that institutional mechanisms insure organizations
against inability to rely on process based trust. "Managers insure the
workers against shirking, unions and other employee organizations insure wage
earners against owner opportunism, stock markets insure investors against fraud
and misrepresentation, professionalization is designed to insure that the
training is adequate to the task, regulations insure the parties to a
transaction that is regulated against the use of a different set of rules. This
kind of insurance' forms the basis of transactions when trust needs to be
recreated." (Zucker 1986:101). Thus, the process of industrialization
involves a process of replacing process based trust by institution-based trust.
This applies a fortiori to export led development and to the process of trade
globalisation, since these things involve dealing with strangers in foreign
countries. What is left unsaid here is the possibility that, as process based
mechanisms shrink and institutional based mechanisms expand, character based
trust may expand temporarily to fill the gap between the other two mechanisms.
This might help explain the rapid rise of racism in newly marketizing East
Europe, Russia and China. When you no longer rely on old Party friends and
cannot yet believe that contracts guarantee performance, it must be tempting to
input some minimum degree of trust in racial kinship.
An
influential analysis of the economic reforms in China since 1978 highlights the
important role played by culture and level of development in shaping
transactional structures. One of the ways in which bureaucracy has failed there
is in giving way to fiefs so that the distribution of impacted, uncodified
information is skewed in favour of a very few opportunistic players. (Boisot
and Child 1988). They define "fief" (op cit 508) as "small
numbers, hierarchically organized through face to face and power relationships
that often have to be charismatically legitimated - by such means as the laying
on of hands, initiation rites, commendation ceremonies and the like". Like
their idea of a bureaucracy, a fief is hierarchically co-ordinated; but a fief
differs from a bureaucracy in being materially more concerned that its members
share values and beliefs, in the personal rather than impersonal nature of
relationships and by the lack of codification of information. They see the fief
as the least efficient way of diffusing or codifying information. They are
using the word 'fief' almost as a synonym for the word 'clique' rather than in
a way that compares with the medieval fief. The fief as they see it has "a
warm, involved' rationality of vaguely defined ethical principles applied
particularistically." (op cit 522). They say China's mishandling of
decentralization and delegation issues in its modernization have created new
fiefs, and perhaps reinforced old ones in some places, in that country. If we
allow that fiefs as cliques in China often facilitate the acquisition of
private power intermixed with public office and occupation of buildings both
commercial and residential, then we have made an important link between
Boisot-Child fiefs and traditional fiefs. The very important implication of
that is marketization of command economies involves a significant and possibly
inevitable dose of neo feudalism. If that is to be true of China, it is
pertinent to ask whether it was or is true of its neighbour, Japan.
NEO
FEUDAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE BUSINESS
The
best-known techniques of Japanese management are just in time inventory
control, total quality control and quality circles, lifetime employment expectations,
singing the company song at morning rallies and respect for seniority. All
these characteristics are trust-producing mechanisms that combine some
institutional characteristics with some process based ones. They are essential
features of Japanese as opposed to western capitalism. A recent series of
experiments showed that Japanese managers see a work team is an environment in
which information is shared in pursuit of improved performance, while Americans
used groups to share responsibilities and reduce risks (Sullivan 1992)
In
Kaoru Ishikawa's book What Is Total Quality? He states that the basic teachings
of Christianity appear to say that man is by nature evil and that this teaching
has cast a shadow over the Western nations' management philosophy. It suggests
that people cannot be trusted (Stewart 1992)
Some of
the distinctive features of Japanese capitalism may reflect an unbroken feudal
tradition in some respects at least. In contrast to the view that, in Japan,
capitalism destroyed feudalism and undermined the rule of the elite during the
Tokugawa period, commercial wealth was the salvation of the lord and his
retainers since samurai and merchants retained economic primacy and developed
innovative institutions which increased their own profits while providing
financial services which sheltered tenant residents from the almost severe
market dislocations (Johnson 1983).
Even in
the present, scandals in Japan have less severe consequences for their
perpetrators than in the West. The recent Recruit scandal involving Japan’s
four largest securities brokers has exposed a system in which politicians,
bureaucrats, big business, and sometimes even gangsters cooperate to keep the
country’s economic engine primed. When the Japanese stock market crashed in á1990,
Nomura securities and its three main competitors covered the losses of their
best clients and reported the payments as tax-deductible entertainment
expenses. The payments broke few laws and shocked few Japanese, but the tax
evasion attempts incurred the wrath of the powerful Finance Ministry, whose tax
officials began talking publicly about widespread corruption. Nonetheless, the
case of Yoshihisa Tabuchi, former president of Nomura Securities, exemplifies
how Japan's disgraced business and political leaders can bounce back. Tabuchi
resigned from Nomura after acknowledging that the company secretly compensated
big clients for stock market losses. News reports charged that Nomura had
financed some business enterprises with the Japanese mob. Tabuchi is not out of
a job, however; he 6á2 became Nomura's vice-chairman. (Rapoport 1991). This
extra legal act of nurture could be viewed as an incident of modern vassalage.
To put it another way, in order for us to say to you "we look after our
people", first you have to become one of our people. And we have already
seen how the enterprise groups themselves create vassal companies among their
subcontractors. A sense of mutual obligation and public weal even extends to
the Yakuza. Japan’s biggest Yakuza crime syndicate has issued its own code of
conduct. The 30,000 member Yamaguchi-gumi's code bans recruits from throwing
cigarette buts on the ground, making grand entrances into hotels, trains or
golf courses, or giving out business cards with the gang's symbol. A gang
spokesperson explained, "The basic idea is not to inconvenience the
public" (Kohut and Sweet 1994). We have seen how the lawless warriors of
the first feudal age became chivalric knights under the influence of the
Church. We may be about to see the decriminalisation of the old villains, the
Yakuza in Japan, the IRA in England, as new demon cults arise to take their
place and in so doing, make knights out of gangsters. It happened before.
It can
be appreciated from these snippets that Japanese business society is one where
the feudal values of fealty, the personal basis of obligations and the
reluctance to allow public law into the private demesne all flourish. As
Japan’s multinationals acquire western business groups, the Japanese expatriate
manager class starts to resemble the medieval Normans in their separation from
the society of the acquirees and their attempts to mount Japanese business
methods on the Anglo-Saxon vernacular. Yankee samurai are Americans who are
employed by Japanese-owned firms in the US. Few Yankee Samurai expressed
respect for the Japanese employees' strong work ethic and willingness to work
long hours, while many expressed resentment. Yankee samurai are uncomfortable
with Japanese coordinators,' often referred to as spies or shadows. Yankee
Samurai believe that the personnel rotation policies of Japanese firms keep
Japanese employees from really understanding Americans. Japanese management by
consensus usually involves only the Japanese managers. Only the Japanese seem
to enjoy lifetime employment, and the firm's mission is rarely communicated to
the non-Japanese employees. (Laurie 1990). There is a strong parallel between
these Americans under Japanese management and the British Anglo-Saxons of 900
years ago under the Norman Conquest, but it is one that can only be elaborated
properly in a far longer work than this paper.
The
Korean style of management is credited with much of the success of the
country's business ventures. Known as K-type management, its distinguishing
characteristics are summarized in Lee and Yoo (1987). Korea has the so far
unique distinction of preserving the oath of fealty in its business practices,
and of administering it annually. Thus, Korean business is even more feudal
than the Japanese but scarcely less successful in conventional economically
measured dimensions. We now discuss the opinion of some writers’
non-organizational behavior that western corporations have reached a situation
satisfying the preconditions for feudalism.
WESTERN
CORPORATE FEUDALISM
Edward
Mason [1959] was one of the first Americans to consider whether managers could
any longer consider their responsibilities to be of a wholly private nature;
America, he said, "is a society of large corporations. [Whose] management
is in the hands of a few thousand men. Who selected these men, if not to rule
over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and to whom are they
responsible?" He thought administrative hierarchies had replaced the
market as society’s basic distributive mechanism. When GE faced antitrust
charges in the 30s, its chairman, attorney Owen Young, developed the defence
that the modern firm had aggregated wealth to such an extent that it had
acquired a public function limiting the owners' rights over that wealth; and
that by divorcing control from ownership, the firm had given its own management
an unprecedented degree of autonomy which carried with it the duty of care of
any public trustee. He told Harvard business school class of á1927 that they
were public trustees who should be educated as such (Case and Case
1982)."To the business community and the solicitor, land and capital are
equally investments, between which, since they possess the common
characteristic of yielding income without labour, it is inequitable to
discriminate. Though their significance as economic categories may be
different, their effect as social institutions is the same. It is to separate
property from creative activity, and to divide society into two classes, of
which one has its primary interest in passive ownership, while the other is
mainly dependent upon active work." (Tawny ì1921/1961:67). Actually, even
as economic resources the resemblance between medieval land and modern capital
may be less distant than we generally assume. Early medieval manorial evolution
was not a single process of disintegration; great estates were formed and
fragmented throughout the period, so resembling blocks of modern capital rather
than the inalienable entailed estates of popular imagination. (Klingelhofer
1985) "Property is in its nature a kind of limited sovereignty..Property
in things swells, in effect, into something which is sovereignty over persons.’
The main objection to a large corporation,' writes Mr Justice Brandeis of the
Supreme Court of the USA, is that it makes possible and in many cases makes
inevitable - the exercise of industrial absolutism." (Tawney 1921/1961:77)
Increasingly
as it enters the government businesses, the corporation is in the business of
refashioning social, health, cultural, and other services not only as
commercial products but also as products that reflect the corporation’s own
class, property, power, and value relations. All in all then, it is appropriate
to view the modern corporation as a fabricator of social relationships,
directly, indirectly, blindly, and by design, as the case may be (McDermott
1991:199) Even Foucault’s work is relevant because it suggests that all
organisational forms are essentially alike, and, as individuals, we are all
imprisoned
Within
an organizational world. (Burrell 1988). Finally the cover of Newsweek at the
time of writing around June 20, á1995 asks "does government matter?"
in an age where big business is global and makes all the resource allocation
decisions that count. Even to ask the question at all seems no longer so
strange as we pass along the postmodern travellator, perhaps to some kind of
feudalism where all the power that counts is private and tied to fiefdom. These
quotations suggest, even if they do not persuade, that the power and influence
of modern companies shapes the societies in which they operate. To the extent
that this is so, there is the feudal spectre of private power with public
duties which the law may be loth to enforce. The relevance of this perspective
to business ethics and corporate crime will be argued next.
MODERN
BANALITIES
Reich
(1987) argues that lack of trust within American business culture is robbing
U.S. companies of the flexibility they need to remain competitive. Collective
entrepreneurialism -an approach to capitalism in which distinctions between
owners and workers are blurred- can create options for companies trying to
adjust to economic change. Such a strategy, however, requires a level of trust
few American companies can muster. Tacit understandings between employees and managers
working together to weather economic hardships are often breached when they
become inconvenient. Those who renege on informal agreements may overcome the
damage done to their reputations, but those who were betrayed are never as
trusting again. Precautions, rules, and codes proliferate as trust erodes, and
commercial dealings become increasingly constrained by contractual
stipulations. (Reich 1987).
Rothschild
(1985) argues corporate crime is inherent in the free enterprise system. E. F.
Hutton's check-kiting operations, Exxon's fraud, Eli Lilly's criminal
negligence, as well as the Dalkon Shield and Ford Pinto, are to him only the
tip of the iceberg. Greed, ambition, and the overriding preoccupation with
profit account for much of the criminal activity, but other factors also come
into play. Corporations are built on bureaucratic models. The diffusion of
responsibility promotes a psychic isolation from the activities of the
collective. Nobody in a hierarchy, from the president on down, is immune from pressure,
and charges of wrongdoing shock officials, who think of themselves as moral
individuals. (Rothschild 1985).
Some
senior executives are so insulated from financial pressures that they do not
realize the effect that their insistence on performance has on many employees.
Organizations should not use profits or quotas as the primary basis for
evaluation of workers, since this practice can lead workers to fall back on
unethical methods of meeting goals. Instead, Hosmer recommends that
organizations should put more emphasis on other indicators of performance, such
as customer complaints and community attitudes. (Hosmer 1987). Any such move
would be a move away from scientific Taylorist management towards the
"warm rationality", as Boisot and Child (1988) put it, of fief based
feudalism. More than half of the respondents to a survey by the magazine
working woman believe that business ethics have deteriorated in the eighties.
The majority of respondents said that they had witnessed such foul play as
lying to employees, expense-account abuses, and in-office jockeying involving
favouritism, nepotism, and the taking of credit for other people's work. Almost
half have seen sexual and racial discrimination, and just under a third have
witnessed lying to make a sale. Nearly
percent of the respondents who don't have a formal code of ethics at
their workplace believe that instituting one would be helpful, although less
than a third of them want the government to regulate ethics. (Sandroff 1990).
This is the first survey I was able to find where an explicit link was made
between reducing malpractice at work and the creation of a corporate
"code", thus echoing the role the medieval church ascribed to the
"code" of chivalry that it blessed as an instrument to achieve the
"Peace of God."
CONCLUSION:
A WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE
Weber
distinguished two types rationalities of institutions: formal and substantive.
The difference between formal and substantial rationality is as follows Formal
rationality is represented by quantitative calculation and accounting. It
represents the extent to which provision for needs is, and can be, expressed in
incalculable terms. Substantive rationality represents the degree to which
supply of resources is shaped under some set qualitative criterion of values,
such as ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian, or
otherwise. Formal rationality concerns means and substantive rationality
concerns ends. Weber describes modern organisations as systems based on formal
rationality
With no
inherent connection to specific substantive ends or outcomes, the modern
corporation fits that characterization and is the one still central to economic
theory and most management courses at most universities. The postmodern
corporation, as it responds to pressures for socially responsible behavior and
in some cases seeks to evade them, will move away from that characterization
towards a substantive rationality whose value content would be reflected in its
mission statement, code of conduct and leadership behavior internally. This
paper has suggested some of the ways in which such a move recreates some of the
ingredients, and several of the preconditions, of Feudalism.
REFERENCES
Appignanesi
R and C Garratt, Postmodernism for Beginners, Icon:Cambridge, 1995.
Bell,
Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 1976, NY:Basic Books
Bloch,
Marc, Feudal Society, London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
Boje D
M, "On Being Postmodern in the Academy An Interview With Stewart
Clegg"
Journal of Management Inquiry 2(2):191-200, June 1993.
Boisot,
Max; and John Child, "The Iron Law of Fiefs: Bureaucratic Failure and
The
problem of Governance in the Chinese Economic Reforms, Administrative science
Quarterly,
33:4 507-527, December 1988.
Brown,
Elizabeth A R, "The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and historians
of
medieval Europe", American Historical Review 79(4):1063-1088, October
1974.
Burrell,
Gibson, "Modernism, Post Modernism and Organizational Analysis 2:
The
contribution of Michel Foucault" Organization Studies 9:2 221-235, 1988.
Case J
Y and Case E N, Owen D Young and American Enterprise: A Biography,
Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982
Clegg,
Stewart R, Modern Organizations, London: Sage, 1990.
Ganshof,
F L, Feudalism, London: Longmans Green and Co, 1952.
Heilbroner,
R l, Business Civilization in Decline London:Penguin, 1976.
Hosmer,
LaRue, "Coping with ethical decisions (views of LaRue Hosmer)", USA
Today v
116, 10 August 1987.
Hyams,
P R, King, Lords and Peasants in Medieval England: The Common Law of
Villeinage
in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Johnson,
Linda Louise, "Patronage and privilege: the politics of
Provincial
capitalism in Tokugawa Japan", Stanford University PhD 1983.
Kohut J
J, and R Sweet, News from the Fringe National Enquirer:35, Apr 19 1994.
Klingelhofer,
E C, "Manor, Vill and Hundred: Rural Development in the Region
of Micheldever, Hampshire 700-1100", Johns
Hopkins University PhD Thesis 1985.
Krugman
Paul, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle", Foreign Affairs 73(6):62-78, 1994
Laurie,
Dennis, "Yankee Samurai and the Productivity of Japanese Firms in
the United States", National Productivity
Review 9:2 131-9, Spring 1990.
Lee
Sang M and Yoo Sangjin, "The K-Type Management: A Driving Force of Korean
ì
Prosperity",
Management International Review 27:4 68-77, Fourth Quarter 1987.
McDermott,
John, Coporate Society: Class, Property and Contemporary Capitalism,
Boulder:Westview
Press, 1991.
Muto I,
"Class Struggle in Post War Japan" 114-137 in McCormack and
Y
Sagimoto's, Democracy in Contemporary Japan, Sydney:Hale & Iremonger, 1986.
Neu,
Dean, "Trust, Contracting and the Prospectus Process",
Accounting,
Organizations & Society 16:3 243-256, 1991.
Rapoport
C, "Good life after disgrace in Japan", Fortune v124 p12, July 29
1991.
Reich,
Robert B, "Enterprise and double cross (excerpt from Tales of
a new
America)", The Washington Monthly vol 18 13-19, January 1987.
Rothschild,
Matthew, "No place for scruples", The Progressive vol 49
26-8,
November 1985.
Sabel C
F, Work and Politics, Cambridge UK: Cambridge U Press, 1982.
Sandroff,
Ronni, "How ethical is American business? (Results of survey)",
Working
woman vol 15 113/4, September 1990.
Stephenson,
Carl, Medieval Feudalism, Cornell University Press 1942.
Stewart,
James R., "The Work Ethic, Ladies and Taylorism in
Japanese
Management Literature", Industrial Management 34:6 23-6 Nov/Dec 1992
Strayer
J R, Feudalism in Western Europe, Macmillan, 1952.
Sullivan,
Jeremiah J, "Japanese Management Philosophies: From the Vacuous to
the
Brilliant", California Management Review 34:2 66-87, Winter 1992.
Tainter
J A, The Collapse of Complex Societies, UK:Cambridge U Press, 1986
Tawney
R H, The Acquisitive Society, London:Collins 1961 (reprint of 1921 text)
Thurow
L, "Revitalizing American Industry: Managing in a Competitive World
Economy",
California Management Review 27(1):9-40, 1984.
Way,
Karen Grose, "Keeping Trouthe: fidelity and speech in Chaucer",
Rutgers
University PhD thesis 1986.
Vaga,
Tonis, "The Coherent Market Hypothesis", Financial Analysts
Journal
ì46:6, 36-49, Nov/Dec 1990.
Weber
M, General Economic History, New York:Collier Books, 1961.
Wickham
C, "The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism",
Past
and Present 103:3-36, May 1984.
Zucker,
Lynne G, "Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of economic
Structure
ì1840-1920", Research in Organizational Behavior Vol 8, 53-111, JAI Press,
1986.